A Case for the Abolition of Capital Punishment by Kaplan, Edward A.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 29 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1967-1968 Term: A Symposium
February 1969
A Case for the Abolition of Capital Punishment
Edward A. Kaplan
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Edward A. Kaplan, A Case for the Abolition of Capital Punishment, 29 La. L. Rev. (1969)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol29/iss2/23
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of it. In this connection, the Whitherspoon30 decision relative to
standards for selecting jurors in capital cases makes the prob-
ability of getting a death penalty slight.
P. Raymond Lamonica
A CASE FOR THE ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court
noted in this issue1 and the nationwide debate which preceded
them seriously question the advisability and constitutionality
of capital punishment. This note will examine the legislative and
judicial considerations bearing on these questions.
Legislative Considerations
At the turn of the nineteenth century, Edward Livingston,
in his proposed penal code, advocated "the total abolition of
capital punishment. ' ' 2 The Louisiana legislature rejected his
recommendations, but his work has been repeatedly cited in
later years by those who seek the repeal of capital punishment.
In its 1968 session, the Louisiana legislature again considered
the advisability of a death penalty in a bill calling for its suspen-
sion for six years. 3 However, again it was defeated. The follow-
ing factors normally form, expressly or impliedly, a part of the
consideration of such a proposal. 4
Deterrence
Every year about six in every 100,000 of the population com-
mit capital crimes in spite of the possible capital punishment.
The question here is whether a change in statutory penalty to
long-term imprisonment would serve as an equal deterrent.5
30. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), noted in 29 LA. L. REV.
381 (1969).
1. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), noted in 29 LA. L. REV.
381 (1969), and United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), noted in 29
LA. L. REV. 389 (1969).
2. 2 E. LIVINGSTON, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF EDWARD LTVINGSTON 244
(1873).
3. La. H. Bill 303 (1968).
4. From 1930-1966 Louisiana has electrocuted 133 men. There were 39
electrocutions from 1930-1934, 19 from 1935-1940, 24 from 1940-1944, 23 from
1945-1949, 14 from 1950-1954, 13 from 1955-1959, and 1 in 1961. Of the 133
electrocuted, 30 were white and 103 were Negroes. There have been 116 electro-
cutions for murder; 30 white, and 86 Negro; and 17 for rape, all Negroes. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Bull. No. 41, National Prisoner Statistics, Executions, 1930-1966,
at 10, 12 (April, 1967).




Those who advocate retention of capital punishment argue that
its value as a deterrent is hidden because it is impossible to
determine the number of persons that have been deterred by the
death penalty.6
In principle, differential deterrence can be studied by com-
paring the murder rates of death penalty jurisdictions with the
rates of abolition jurisdictions. The results of this comparison
have shown the abolition jurisdictions to have the lower average
rates.' However, this comparison is superficial. The abolition
states have always had lower homicide rates than the others
because of differences in social organization, composition of
population, and economic and social conditions. The only com-
parison at all defensible is one of closely similar states, some
with and others without the death penalty.8
Significant studies have been made comparing murder rates
of contiguous jurisdictions, some of which have the death
penalty for murder, and others which have imprisonment. The
results of these studies suggest that these murder rates are con-
ditioned by factors other than the penalty. 9 The composition of
these data shows that the trends of the rates of comparable
states with or without the death penalty are similar. 1° The
effect of suspension of capital punishment on murder rates in
eleven American states has also been studied.11 However, no
6. G. MALLORY, THE CASE FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 3-5 (1961).
7. BEDAU at 67-71, 262. Many states do not keep separate statistics on murder
but only homicide rates which include all degrees of homicide (murder, man-
slaughter, negligent homicide). However, these figures are still good indications
of the murder rates. In 1962 the average murder rate for the abolition states was
2.0 per 100,000 of the population. The national average murder rate per 100,000
of the population for the same year was 5.1. In 1965 the average murder rate
of the abolition states was 2.7 per 100,000 of the population, and the non-abolition
states' rate was 5.2 per 100,000. Alabama and Georgia, both having capital
punishment, had murder rates of 11.4 and 11.3, respectively. Vermont, an aboli-
tion state, had the lowest rate of 0.5. Louisiana's murder rate in 1962 was 6.8
and 8.1 in 1965.
8. BEDAU at 262.
9. The murder rate for Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Vermont-the New England region-was 1.7 in 1964 and 2.1 in
1965. Maine, Rhode Island, and Vermont are abolitionist states. The murder rates
in 1965 were Connecticut (1.3), Massachusetts (2.4), Maine (2.1), New Hamp-
shire (2.7), Rhode Island (2.1), Vermont (0.5). The murder rate for the states
of Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington were 3.7 in 1964 and
4.3 in 1965. Alaska, Hawaii, and Oregon are abolitionist states. The murder
rates in 1965 were Alaska (6.3), California (4.7), Hawaii (3.2), Oregon (3.4),
and Washington (2.2) BEDAU at 66-67.
10. Sellin, A Report for the Model Penal Code Project of the American Law
Institute, in THE DEATH PENALTY 23-34 (1959) ; Sellin, Homicides in Reten-
tionists and Abolitionist States, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 135-39 (1967).
11. These states are Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Missouri, Tennessee, Oregon, South Dakota, and Washington. Sellin, Experiments
with Abolition, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 122-24 (1967).
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significant increase or decrease in murder before, during, or
after the suspensions were evident.
12
Comparisons were also made in Philadelphia of murder
rates before, during, and after a publicized capital trial and/or
execution. If the death penalty is a deterrent, its greatest effect
should be shown through executions, which are well publicized.
While it is clear that among some persons who are psychopathic
or psychotic, capital punishment does incite murderous inten-
tions;13 executions and the publicity surrounding capital cases
did not prove to be a factor in the incidence of capital crime.1
4
All of these studies seem to support the basic conclusion of
the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment that "there is no
clear evidence in any figures we have examined that the aboli-
tion of capital punishment has led to an increase in the homicide
rates, or that its reintroduction has led to a fall.' 1 5 The Royal
Commission's report is the most thorough study of capital
punishment in existence today,16 and studies completed since
have reached similar conclusions. 1 7
Other Considerations
Retentionists state that imprisonment is more expensive.
However, while the state must maintain a person under sen-
tence of life imprisonment for a longer period, the costs of
capital punishment are also high. Statutory requirements of
solitary confinement for death row and the higher level of
12. Sellin, A Report for the Model Penal Code Project of the American Law
Institute, in THE DEATH PENALTY 34-38 (1959) ; Sellin, Experiments with Aboli-
tion, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 122-24 (1967).
13. J. DEMARCUS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 7 (Kentucky Legislative Research
Commission Information Bull. No. 40) (May 1965).
14. BEDAU at 315-322. Five cases of great notoriety were chosen from 1927,
1929, 1930, 1931, and 1932, all homicide deaths listed in the records of the
coroner during 60 days before and after each case was studied. There were a total
of 91 homicides in the "before execution" periods and 133 in the "after" periods.
Of the 204 homicides included in the study, 19 resulted in sentences for murder
in the first degree. Nine of them had occurred during the 60-day periods preceding
and 10 in the corresponding periods following the executions. During the ten
days before the executions there were two and during the ten days immediately
following there were three such first degree murders in Philadelphia.
15. J. DEMARCUS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 7 (Kentucky Legislative Research
Commission Information Bull. No. 40, May 1965); ROYAL COMMISSION ON
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT § 65, at 67-68 (1949-53).
16. J. DEMARCUS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 7 (Kentucky Legislative Research
Commission, Information Bull. No. 40, May 1965).
17. Id. at 8. See CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY REPORT ON THE DEATH PENALTY
30 (1957) ; CEYLON, REPORT ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 45, 52 (1959) ; PENNSYL-
VANIA REPORT ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 20-24 (1961). See also T. SELLIN,
PUBLIC HEARING BEFORE THE COMMISSION APPOINTED To STUDY CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT IN NEW JERSEY 22-23 (Pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Assembly
Chamber, State House, Trenton, New Jersey, July 10, 1964).
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security required are expensive. The inmates on death row
contribute nothing to their own upkeep, while other prisoners
work in various prison industries. There are also high court
costs involved in the administration of justice in most capital
cases. Much of this time and expense would be unnecessary if it
were not for the death penalty. 18
Most criminologists agree that it is the swiftness and prob-
ability of conviction which deters criminal behavior, not the
severity of the penalty.19 The substitution of imprisonment for
capital punishment would probably result in more convictions,
since juries are hesitant to convict, realizing that their action
may result in the death of the accused. A large proportion of
all serious crimes, including gangland killings and kidnappings
for ransom, are committed by those who think they will never
be caught. The only way to deter such persons is by increasing
the effectiveness of law enforcement.20
Those who favor the retention of capital punishment fear
that the capital criminal when paroled will inflict further
damage on society by repeating his crime.2 1 However, a study
conducted in 1967 of the behavior of parolees after imprison-
ment for willful homicide showed that only three persons (two-
tenths of one percent) were convicted again of willful homicide
during the year after parole. Ninety-one percent were found to
have "favorable" parole performance. The study concludes that
persons convicted of capital crimes are generally the most
reliable groups of prisoners and parolees.22
Many police officers feel that the criminal, in attempting to
escape or destroy evidence, would resort to violence against
pursuing police if the death penalty was not present. However, a
1954 survey found that fatal attack on police in death penalty
18. J. DEMARcuS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 8 (Kentucky Legislative Research
Commission Information Bull. 40, May 1965).
19. Id. at 7 and 8.
20. See BFnAu at 258, 405.
21. According to a recent survey of parole and release procedures, there are
thirteen states (Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Wyoming)
in which "some or all life prisoners are ineligible for parole." T. SELLIN, A REPORT
FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, THE
DEATH PENALTY 131, 402 (1959).
LA. R.S. 15:574.3 (B) (1956) : "No parole shall be granted to any prisoner
serving a life sentence until his life sentence has been commuted to a fixed term
of years by action of the state board of pardons and the Governor, and until the
prisoner has served at least one-third of the time fixed by the commutation of
sentence."
22. NEWSLETTER, UNIFORM PAROLE REPORTS OF THE NATIONAL PROBATION
AND PAROLE INSTITUTES (Dec. 1967).
1969]
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states was 1.3 per 100,000 population, while fatal attacks on
police in abolition states was only 1.2 per 100,000 population.
23
In addition, leading prison officials do not believe that the




The question of the constitutionality of capital punishment
is being raised by numerous condemned men across the nation
in challenging the death penalty. These challenges have resulted,
inter alia, in the staying of all executions in California 2 and
Florida pending a determination of the complex and weighty
constitutional questions presented. 26 The constitutional objec-
tions that may be raised against capital punishment rest on
two clauses of the Constitution, the prohibition against "cruel
and unusual punishment"27 in the eighth amendment,28  and
the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
Eighth Amendment
The early decisions of the United States Supreme Court held
that the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" applied only
to the death practices of several centuries ago.29 Only such ex-
23. J. DEMARCUS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 8 (Kentucky Legislative Research
Commission Information Bull. No. 40, May 1965). All of the studies available
in this area show a lack of statistical difference between capital punishment states
and abolition states. T. Sellin, The Death Penalty and Police Safety, in CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 138 (1967).
24. A. MACCORMICKC, PUBLIC HEARING BEFORE THE COMMISSION APPOINTED
To STUDY CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN NEW JERSEY 53A (Pursuant to Senate Joint
Resolution No. 3, Assembly Chamber, State House, Trenton, July 10, 1964).
25. However, in In re Jackson, 37 U.S.L.W. 2288 (Cal. 1968), the California
Supreme Court upheld capital punishment as not violative of the due process clause
or the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
26. See Hill v. Nelson, 271 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Calif. 1967) ; Adderly v.
Wainwright, 272 F. Supp. 530 (M.D. Fla. 1967). See also Maxwell v. Bishop,
385 U.S. 650 (1967) ; Clarke v. Grimes, 374 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1967).
27. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) : "Whether the word 'unusual'
has any qualitative meaning different from 'cruel' is not clear. On the few
occasions this Court has had to consider the meaning of the phrase, precise
distinctions between cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have been drawn.
These cases indicate that the Court simply examines the particular punishment
involved in light of the basic prohibition against inhuman treatment, without
regard to any subtleties of meaning that might be latent in the word 'unusual'.
If the word 'unusual' is to have any meaning apart from the word 'cruel,' however,
the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something different from that
which is generally done."
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII: "Excessive bail shall not Tbe required nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
LA. CONST. art 1, § 12 provides identical language.
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 878: "A sentence shall not be set aside on the ground
that it inflicts cruel or unusual punishment unless the statute under which it is
imposed is found unconstitutional."
29. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
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treme practices as "burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking
on the wheel, or the like"30 were unconstitutional.
The contemporary view of "cruel and unusual punishment"
was first stated in Weems v. United States.31 There the defendant
had been sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment carrying a
chain hanging from his ankle and wrist. He was also to be em-
ployed at hard and painful labor and suffer permanent loss of
civil rights. The Supreme Court, in holding the sentence "cruel
and unusual" stated that "[t]he clause of the Constitution...
is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by humane justice. 3 2 Thus
the English Bill of Rights of 1968 would no longer be allowed
to determine the meaning of "cruel and unusual" but in its stead
"the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society"3 would be used. The Court established "a
primary concept that the definition of cruelty shall be fashioned
in terms of the present and future needs of society, rather than
the public's inclination, or standards regarding cruelty of
medieval Europe. ' '3
4
In early cases the Supreme Court held that the eighth amend-
ment limited only the federal government and did not apply to
the states.3 5 However, in Weems the Court elevated its im-
portance by holding it "essential to the rule of law and the
maintenance of individual freedom." 6 Then in Robinson v. Cal-
ifornia, 37 the Court incorporated it into the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment by declaring unconstitutional a
California statute punishing the status of narcotic addition.
In Rudolph v. Alabama11 the Supreme Court, by denying
certiorari, refused to consider whether the imposition of the
death penalty on a convicted rapist who has neither taken nor
30. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910) (dissenting
opinion) ; Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 130 (1878) ; Note, 36 N.Y.U. L.
Rzv. 846, 847 (1961).
31. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). See Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
32. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
33. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
34. BEDAu at 200: "Haven't we, then, at our present-day level of social
progress and civilization arrived at the point where to retain capital punishment
any longer as a part of our system of justice would seem to be as obsolete as
using galleys, torture or branding?" See Cutler, Criminal Punishment-Legal and
Moral Considerations, 6 CATHOLIC LAw. 110, 111-12 (1960).
35. See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892) ; In re Kemmler, 136 U.S.
436 (1890).
36. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
37. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
38. 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
19691
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endangered human life violates the prohibition against "cruel
and unusual punishment." However, Justice Goldberg, joined
by Justices Douglas and Brennan, favored granting certiorari
to consider whether capital punishment for rape (1) violates
the evolving standards of our society; (2) punishes dispropor-
tionate to the offense; and (3) constituted an unnecessary
cruelty if the aims of punishment-deterrence, isolation, re-
habilitation-could be achieved as effectively by a less severe
punishment than death. The significance of the dissent may be
appreciated when it is recognized that the "cruel and unusual
punishment" issue was not presented in the petition for cer-
tiorari.39
Society's standard of decency with regard to the death
penalty is certainly evolving to the point where it is considered
abhorrent.40 This is evidenced by the number of states that have
abolished it, either by action of the legislature in suspending it"'
or action of the executive branch in failing to carry it out.42 In
the past, the court has taken judicial notice of such changes
in declaring other punishments "cruel and unusual.
' 3
Capital punishment may also violate the eighth amendment
in the manner it is administered. The lack of criteria to guide
juries or judges in imposing a death sentence may render it
"cruel and unusual." The death penalty may be cruel not only
because it is extreme but because it is wanton, and unusual
not only because it is rare, but because the decision to remove
the defendant from the ordinary penological regime is ar-
bitrary 44 However, this lack of standards may also be a violation
of due process and will be discussed in detail there.
Due Process Clause
The Supreme Court of the United States has long condemned
a degree of vagueness in criminal statutes that "licenses the
39. In Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917 (1950), the
court belittled the precedent value of dissents from denial of writs.
40. Increasing public sentiment against the death penalty is evident. The
Gallup Poll recently reported that a majority of Americans favor its abolition.
Philadelphia Bulletin, July 1, 1966, at 7, col. 6. Concerned private and public
agencies agree. The influential National Council on Crime and Delinquency
recommended abolition in 1936. See 9 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 225 (1963).
41. See note 11 supra.
42. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BULL. No. 41, NATIONAL
PRISONER STATISTICS, EXECUTIONS, 1930-1966, at 9-13 (April 1967).
43. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) ; Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1958).
44. See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 891 (1963) (dissenting opinion)
Note, 42 N.C. L. REv. 909 (1964).
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jury to create its own standard in each case. '45 The vices of such
statutes46 are that they not only fail to give fair warning of
prohibited conduct, but that they also provide the foundation
for jury arbitrariness and persuasion by impermissible con-
siderations. In Giaccio v. Pennsylvania47 the Supreme Court
stated:
"It is established that a law fails to meet the require-
ments of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and
standardless that it leaves judges and jurors free to decide,
without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and
what is not in each particular case."
4 8
In capital cases jurors are not required to direct their at-
tention to the purposes of criminal punishment, nor to any
pertinent aspect or aspects of the defendant's conduct. They
are not invited to consider the moral heinousness of the de-
fendant's acts, his susceptibility or lack of susceptibility to re-
formation, or the extent of the deterrent effect of killing the
defendant.4 9 They are permitted to choose between life and death
upon conviction for any reason or for no reason at all. There
are no criteria to assure that there will be a connection between
the sentence they exact and a reasonable justification for ex-
acting it.," To concede the complexity and interrelation of sen-
tencing goals 51 is no reason to sustain a procedure which ignores
them all. Under such a sentencing regime, capital punishment in
those few, selected cases where it is applied may be arbitrary
and thereby a violation of the due process clause.
The imposition of the death penalty may also inflict the
loss of life without commensurate justification. Life is a funda-
mental right, protected by the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. Because of the advances of man's
liberty, culture, and civilization for many generations, there
45. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937). See, e.g., Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931); Cline v.
Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927) ; Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269
U.S. 385 (1926).
46. The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure fails to provide any such
criteria. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 782, 814, 815, 817.
47. 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
48. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966).
49. Of. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV.
1071 (1964).
50. Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
51. See Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L.




has been a lessening of severity of punishment, accompanied by
an increasing appreciation and valuation of life.52
When the state attempts to restrict a fundamental right it can
do so only on the showing of a "compelling interest. ' ' 53 The
state's "compelling interest" asserted to justify criminal sanc-
tions is the punishment and treatment of criminal offenders,
under which three legitimate ends can be characterized :4 (1)
deterrence, (2) isolation, and (3) rehabilitation. Vengeance is
not a legitimate legislative purpose. It is by nature irrational
and should not justify capital punishment.5
As noted above,56 capital punishment is not a more effective
deterrent than life imprisonment. Deterrence as an objective of
criminal law, therefore, does not demonstrate that the state
has a "compelling interest" in executing the condemned, for
there are alternative means less subversive of the fundamental
right to life available to the state for accomplishing that ob-
jective. Of the two remaining legitimate purposes of criminal
sanctions, isolation and rehabilitation, it is submitted once again
the "compelling interest" requirement is unfulfilled. Capital
punishment is not a way to meet those objectives; it is a way
to avoid them. Therefore, since the state has no demonstrable
"compelling interest" in inflicting the death penalty, it should
be held unconstitutional.
Conclusion
As the advantages of the death penalty over life imprison-
ment have been shown to be lacking, it should be abolished, or
at least suspended by the legislature. Its inherent evils are
exposed by the United States Department of Justice:
52. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) : "The basic concept underlying
the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State
has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this limit be
exercised within the limits of civilized standards."
It can be summarized that the majority of the Justices of the United States
Supreme Court dislike capital punishment and find it repugnant. Id. at 99:
"Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on moral
grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment-and they are
forceful ...."
53. Sherbert v. Werner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ; NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 644 (1943).
54. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 891 (1963) (dissenting opinion)
People v. Oliver, 1 N.Y.2d 152, 160, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367, 373, 134 N.E.2d 197, 201
(1956).
55. People v. Oliver, 1 N.Y.2d 152, 160, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367, 373 (1956),
134 N.E.2d 197, 201 (1956).
56. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
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"We favor the abolition of the death penalty. Modern
penology with its correctional and rehabilitative skills affords
greater protection to society than the death penalty which
is inconsistent with its goals. This Nation is too great in its
resources and too good in its purposes to engage in the light
of present understanding in the deliberate taking of human
life as either a punishment or a deterrent to domestic
crime." 57
However, in default of legislative action in this area, the United
States Supreme Court seems to be moving toward such a result.
This is evidenced by the attitude taken by the Court in the two
cases noted in this series,5s and the fact that the Court has
granted certiorari in a case which clearly presents the issue.
5 9
It is submitted that society's "evolving standard of decency"
requires the court to declare capital punishment unconstitutional.
Edward A. Kaplan
CIVIL PROCEDURE-DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT
AFTER INVALID EXECUTORY PROCESS
After default in payments plaintiff successfully foreclosed
via executiva on a chattel mortgage securing the purchase price
of defendant's automobile, without authentic evidence of the
chattel mortgage. Since defendant, although having notice of
the proceedings, did not seek to enjoin or appeal the seizure and
sale, the car was sold to a third party.1 Soon thereafter, plain-
tiff sought a deficiency judgment for the balance of the debt.
Defendant's administratrix argued that the acknowledgment of
the chattel mortgage under private signature, by an agent of the
mortgagee, was improper; the evidence given in order to use
executory process was illegal; and therefore everything done sub-
sequently was null and void.2 Held, where executory process is
invalid because a chattel mortgage under private signature has
not been duly acknowledged, a deficiency judgment is not al-
57. Letter of then Deputy Attorney General Ramsey Clark to the Honorable
John L. McMillan, Chairman, House Committee on the District of Columbia, July
23, 1965, reported in the N.Y. Times, July 24, 1965, at 1, col. 5.
58. Notes, 29 LA. L. REV. 381 (1969) 29 LA. L. REV. 389 (1969).
59. Boykin v. Alabama, 37 U.S.L.W. 3133 (Oct. 15, 1968).
1. Although the facts of the case are unclear, it will be assumed for the purpose
of this Note that no appeal or injunction was sought, and that the automobile was
sold to a third party purchaser in good faith.
2. Since the agent of the chattel mortgagee was neither the grantor of nor a
witness to the act as required by LA. R.S. 13:3720 (1950), the act was not duly
acknowledged.
1969]
